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FEDERAL LAW GOVERNS A FOREIGN CORPORATION'S
PRESENCE IN A STATE IN A DIVERSITY ACTION
Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.
282 F2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960)
Plaintiff commenced an action in a federal district court in New York
based on diversity of citizenship against two New York corporations to
recover for personal injuries. One defendant sought to implead a North
Carolina corporation as a third-party defendant. Process against the North
Carolina corporation was served in New York on a New York corporation
acting as a selling agent in New York for the North Carolina corporation.
The federal district court granted a motion to vacate service on the ground
that the North Carolina corporation was not present in the forum under
New York law. The court of appeals in reversing held that the determi-
nation of a foreign corporation's presence in a district, for purposes of
service of process, is a procedural matter and accordingly must be determined
by the federal standard.
In order to obtain a valid judgment, a court must have jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.' Unless otherwise provided by Congress,
personal jurisdiction is obtained by service of process in the state in which
the federal court is sitting.2 Accordingly, a corporation must be present,
i.e., doing business, in the state amenable to process. 3 Since a corporation
is an abstraction, numerous tests have been developed to determine when
a corporation is "present" in a state. 4
A recurrent problem in federal diversity litigation has been that of
determining whether a federal court is bound by the state standard with
respect to presence of a corporation when the state standard is more re-
strictive that the federal standard. Neither courts5 not commentators6
are in agreement.
1 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
3 International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Bank of America v.
Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Philadelphia & R. R.R. v. McKibbin,
243 U.S. 264 (1917); Cf., Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119
(1927); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1897); 2 Moore, Federal Practice 969
(2d ed. 1948).
4 For a discussion of "doing business" tests, see Note, 21 Ohio St. L.J. 126 (1960).
5 For a lengthy discussion and citation of cases, see Kenny v. Alaska Airlines,
Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 715 (1956).
6 Compare I Moore, Federal Practice ff 4.25 (2d ed. 1948) with 1 Barron &
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 605, 696 (Wright ed. 1960). See also Com-
ment, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 394 (1956); Comment, 30 Ind. L.J. 324 (1955); Comment,
4 Wayne L. Rev. 164 (1958); Note, 5 Duke L.J. 129 (1956); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
508 (1956); Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 715 (1956); Note, 34 St. John's L. Rev. 146
(1959); Note, 67 Yale L.J. 1094 (1958); Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 960, 961 (1953).
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The federal courts have, generally, taken one of two approaches.
First, some courts rely on Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure" which provides that service may also be made ". . . in the
manner prescribed by the law of the state . ... ,9 This language is
said to include the state's concept of "doing business."' 0 Thus, in Pulson
v. American Rolling Mill Co. 1 a two step analysis was used: (1) Did the
state provide for bringing the corporation into its courts? (2) Was this
within due process limitations? At the same time, it seems clear that Rule
4(d) (7) deals with only the manner or mechanical aspects of service on
corporate defendants and does not deal with their amenability to process.12
The courts using the second approach invoke the familiar procedural-
substantive dichotomy of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 3 The courts in this
category, which hold that state law governs a corporation's amenability
to process, 14 rigidly apply the outcome-determinative test of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York. 15 The result is that if the corporation is not amenable
to service from a state court, it is likewise not amenable to service from
a federal court sitting in the same state. Some courts avoid such rigid ap-
7 A third approach is taken in Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 128 F. Supp.
669, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). This court relies on the "doing business" language on
the venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1958), as equally applicable to service of
process on a corporation. This is arguable under an historical approach since the
venue and service of process requirements were treated together from the judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 79, until the revision of the Judicial Code, 62 Stat. 869, in
1948 when the venue section went to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and service to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1693. See Barrett, "Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions
for Reform," 7 Vand. L. Rev. 608, 619 (1954); See also Hart & Wechsler, op. cit. supra
note 6.
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7).
9 Ibid.
10 Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); Accord,
Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959); Florio v.
Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957); Robert v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d
893 (7th Cir. 1955); Electrical Equip. Co. v. Hamm Dragage Co., 217 F.2d 656 (8th
Cir. 1954); Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 210 F.2d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 1954); Harris v.
Deere & Co., 128 F. Supp. 799, 802 (E.D.N.C. 1955).
11 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82; Barron & Hotzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure
318, 319 (Rule Ed. 1950); 2 Moore, Federal Practice 969, 970 (1948). See also
Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., 219 F.2d 115, 120 (6th Cir. 1955); Gravely
Motor Plow & Cultivator Co. v. Carter Co., 193 F.2d 158, 159 (9th Cir. 1951); see
also Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, supra note 5, at 843.
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14 Smith v. Ford Gum & Mach. Co., 212 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1954); Robbins
v. Benjamin Air Rifle Co., 209 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1954); Partin v. Michaels Bronze
Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 199
F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir.
1949); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Kenny v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., supra note 5.
15 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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plicaton of the outcome-determinative test and hold this matter is pro-
cedural for the purposes of Erie.16
The Supreme Court has not passed squarely on the application of
the Erie principle to this problem. However, some indications of the scope
of the Erie doctrine are apparent. To avoid a conceptual application of
Erie the Supreme Court held that state practice must be followed where
it will substantially affect the outcome of the litigation.17 The outcome
test has been applied even as to form and mode of litigation.' 8 In Angel
v. Bullington,19 a case involving a state statute forbidding a claim for
deficiency judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action, the Court held
that federal courts must follow state practice. A similar result was reached
in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co ° where the statute required that a
corporation register with the state as a prerequisite to bringing an action.
In both Angel and Woods, permitting the actions to be maintained in a
federal forum would have thwarted declared state policies.
The court in the principal case relied on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Co-op.?' where the federal procedure of jury determination of a
factual question was followed in the face of a state workmen's compen-
sation statute which allocated this function to the judge. Byrd appears to
modify the outcome-determinative test used under Erie insofar as it says:
Were outcome the only consideration a strong case might appear
for saying the federal courts should follow state practice. But
there are affirmative countervailing considerations . . . . The
federal system is an independent system for administering justice
to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction . . . . The
policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obli-
gations cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule--
not bound up with rights and obligations . .. *22
16 See, e.g, Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc., supra note 12; French v. Gibbs
Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951); Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo,
175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949); Echeverry v. Kellogg Switch-
board & Supply Co., 175 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1949); Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine
Co., 167 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1948); Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir.
1946); Jacobowitz v. Tompson 141 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1944); General Elec. Co.
v. Masters Mail Order Co., 122 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Ackerly v. Com-
mercial Credit Co., 111 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1953); Pike v. New England Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 669 (D. Mass. 1950); Cf., Sarpiro, Inc. v. New York
Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1957), noted in 67 Yale LJ. 1094 (1958).
This decision was based solely on Riverback Lab. v. Hardwood Prod. Corp., 350 U.S.
1003 (1956), in which the Supreme Court reversed (per curiam) the Seventh Circuit
(220 F.2d 465), which had taken the view that state law governed. However, that
opinion appears to be too brief to be conclusive. See Kurland, "Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases," 67 Yale LJ. 187, 211-12
(1957).
17 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
18 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., Inc., 350 U.S. 198 (1955).
19 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
20 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
21 356 U.S. 525 (1957).
22 Id. at 537,
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Thus, the court appears to suggest that an interest-weighing test 23 be used
in this "gray zone" between substance and procedure.
The counterbalancing consideration here is the desirability of per-
mitting the federal system to establish its own jurisdictional requirements.24
The policy of Erie, which is to achieve uniformity of result between federal
and state courts sitting in the same state, 25 cannot be seriously offended by
making the "doing business" requirement procedural. At the same time,
uniformity in the operation of federal courts would be promoted.
The interest to be considered on the opposite side is the state policy
underlying the state rule and its relation to the Erie rule. The state standard
of "doing business" is not bound up with the cause of action; the existence
of the cause of action still depends on the law of the state. The court
in the instant case indicated that the only result of using the outcome
test is to force the action into a North Carolina federal court and thus, to
deny the litigants the procedural advantage of third-party practice available
in federal diversity actions. Since the decision of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington2 6 many courts have broadened their "doing business" con-
cept. 27 This would indicate that there is no restrictive policy in many
states. However, if there were a "door-closing" statute it could represent
?3 The concurring opinion in the principal case suggests that the Byrd case was
based on the seventh amendment and thus not applicable to any other situation. Bt
see, "The Supreme Court, 1957 Term," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 77, 147-50 (1958). See also, ill,
"The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution," 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 541, 601-09 (1958).
24 Barrows S.S. Co. v. Kane, supra note 3 at 100-11; Partin v. Michaels Bronze
Co. (concurring opinion), supra note 14. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissenting in Cohen v.
Beneficial Indust. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949), was the first to suggest an
interest-weighing test. ". . . [Tihe real question is not whether the separation [sub-
stance-procedure] shall be made but how it shall be made: whether mechanically by
reference to whether the state's courts' doors are open or closed, or by a consideration
of the policies of Erie with Congress' power to govern the incidents of litigation in
diversity suits."
25 Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949); Ragan v.
Merchant's Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949); Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, supra note 17, at 101-02.
26 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In this case the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment required that state jurisdiction be asserted only over those foreign
corporations which have certain minimum contacts with the forum so that "the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'
27 See, State v. Harrison, 74 So. 2d. 371 (Fla. 1954); Schilling v. Roux Distilling
Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907 (1953), Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210
Miss. 863, 50 So. 2d 615 (1951); Wooster v. Tremont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682, 203
S.W.2d 411 (1947); Grace v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 95 N.H. 74, 57 A.2d 619 (1948).
In Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Supreme
Court, finding that a dismissal by the Supreme Court of Ohio was based on consti-
tutional fears, held that jurisdiction could be maintained without violating due
process. On remand, 158 Ohio St. 145, 107 N.E.2d 203 (1952), the Ohio Supreme Court,
sustained jurisdiction stating that there was general agreement that jurisdiction might
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a legitimate state policy and thus govern diversity actions in federal court."
The considerations of effective judical administration are clearly more
weighty and suggest that the question of a foreign corporation's presence to
permit service of process be declared a procedural matter within the Erie
dichotomy. Moreover, it would seem that litigants having access to the
federal court system on the ground of diversity of citizenship should be
entitled to the essentials of a trial according to federal standards.29
The main point of conflict between the majority and the concurring
opinion in the principal case is the absence of legislative support for inter-
preting this as a procedural rule. It seems clear that Congress could make
this a rule of procedure. 30 However, it would also seem clear that the
policy of Erie could be undercut by either a statute or a judicial decision
affecting matters outside the federal ambit.31
The majority suggests that under a proper historical approach the
"doing business" requirement has a statutory basis. ". . . [T]he federal
principal of personal service in the district [now the state] goes gack to the
statute creating the federal courts [and] . .. the mere fact that pre-Erie
cases have interpreted and defined the principle .. .does not hide its
statutory basis."'32 Therefore, it is argued that this is a traditional federal
practice and should be continued under Erie.
The situation needs clarfication, but above all, the extent of the Erie
doctrine must be resolved. Heretofore, the courts in dealing with this
problem have not weighed the competing interests or viewed the problem
in historical perspective. This case, then, should help in alleviating some
of the confusion in this area of the law.
be sustained in the present situation. But see, Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co.,
supra note 10, at 195; Ackerly v. Commercial Credit Co., 111 F. Supp. 92, 98 (D.NJ.
1953).
The assumption in the principal case, and in other cases originating in federal
court, is that Internationd Shoe also expresses the federal test. E.g., Latimer v. S/A
Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, supra note 16; Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach.
Co., supra note 16; Clover Leaf Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers
Ass'n, 166 F.2d 626 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1947). Hanley Co. v.
Buffalo Forge Co., 89 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Smith v. Hall, 79 F. Supp.
473 (N.D. Tex. 1948).
28 A state desiring to encourage foreign corporations who would do only a
minimum of business to come into the state might do so by limiting their amena-
bility to suit. Such a statute promoting a legitimate interest could represent a
substantive policy protected by the Erie principle.
29 See Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, supra note 3, at 100-11; Partin v. Michael's
Bronze Co. (concurring opinion), supra note 14.
30 lovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960);
D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958); Sampson v.
Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940). But cf. Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co., supra note 18. See also Hill, "The Erie Doctrine and the Constitu-
tion," 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 436-37 (1958).
31 See generally, Hart, "The Relations Between State and Federal Law," 45
Colum. L. Rev. 489.
2 Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 1960).
